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URN: urn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-20865
URL: http://opus.unibw-hamburg.de/volltexte/2009/2086/
Kruse, Jörn
Das Governance-Dilemma der demokratischen Wirtschaftspolitik
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Dokument 1.pdf (500 KB)
Kurzfassung in englisch
As a result of the prevailing governance structure, economic policy in democracies usually
suffers from specific deficiencies. Among these are the predominance of distributive over
efficiency objectives, the neglect of long-run effects, and the lack of or biased use of expert
knowledge in the political decision making process. These deficiencies can be attributed to a
'monopoly of democratic legitimacy' of the politicians and parties, an overloaded democratic
delegation, the influence of interest groups, and the short-run incentives in the political
process. The focus of this paper is on the reform of the governance structure of economic
policy. It is suggested that a 'dual democratic legitimacy' should be introduced. A 'senate'
which is independent of the political parties will be directly elected by the people. The senate
firstly works as a second chamber in bicameralistic legislation, closely cooperating with
consultative expert institutions. Secondly, the senate acts as a principal for any public
institution outside of the parliament and the government, appointing the top personnel.
SWD-Schlagwörter:
Delegation , Politische Institution
Freie Schlagwörter (deutsch):
Zwei-Kammer-Systeme , Senat
Institut:
Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik / Prof Dr. Kruse
DDC-Sachgruppe:
Wirtschaft
Dokumentart:
Arbeits- / Diskussionspapier
Quelle:
Diskussionspapier Nr. 94, August 2009
Sprache:
deutsch
Erstellungsjahr:
2009
Publikationsdatum:
12.08.2009
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